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Abstract: This paper examines the extent to which neoliberal or post-neoliberal forces have been 
generating a new global or regional social structure of accumulation (SSA) or mode of regulation 
(MOR) through enhancing growth, productivity and financial stability. After outlining the 
contours of neoliberalism and post-neoliberalism, the record of economic performance is 
reviewed over the 1950s-2000s. Highly advanced capitalist economies have mostly been 
undergoing regime maturation while numerous nations of Asia (especially China) have been 
transforming their social structure of accumulation or mode of regulation. Neoliberal and post-
neoliberal forms of governance are only part of the institutional apparatus affecting economic 
performance. They must necessarily be supplemented by some minimal combination of (a) 
(especially) dynamic systems of production and distribution, as well as (b) stable and effective 
finance, (c) some moderation of competition, (d) integrative global institutions, and (e) suitable 
institutions of community and family, to enhance economic performance. 
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Neoliberalism has been undergoing emergence, transformation and evolution over the past thirty years around 
the world, especially since the time of Thatcherism and Reaganomics in the late 1970s and 1980s. It emerged 
in response to the presume failure of the previous Keynesian policy of using discretionary fiscal and monetary 
policy, industry incentives and big government to solve some of the core public goods problems of the age. The 
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question is raised in this paper as to what the record of socioeconomic performance has been under neoliberal 
governance and whether there is in motion a movement towards a post-neoliberal social structure of 
accumulation (SSA) or mode of regulation (MOR). 
 The question of a new and effective SSA or MOR concerns whether there is in place a suitable set of 
production-distribution systems and institutions to promote sustainable long-term growth, productivity and 
stability. Usually MOR scholars place emphasis on global or regional developments, while SSA scholars 
concentrate on national progress. On the basis of David Kotz’s (1994) idea that there is much to be gained by 
linking both traditions, some authors have started also to analyze SSAs in the world economy and MORs in 
national economies (O’Hara 2006a). This paper merges the two traditions while recognizing the need to give 
priority to the regime of accumulation (productivity and demand). 
 A MOR is a production–distribution system (regime of accumulation) which generates sustained 
productivity and effective demand to stimulate GDP growth for (usually) several decades; plus a set of 
ancillary institutions to facilitate stability, cooperation and governance (Aglietta 1979). The global or regional 
Fordist MOR, for instance, during the 1950s-1970s was based around a system of assembly line production, 
economies of scale, Keynesian-welfare state, a moderation of competition, and consumer demand with 
relatively high wages. The relative demise of Fordism through the 1970s and 1980s led to the question of what 
might replace it, and how this may evolve into the future. The flexible system of production, for instance, was 
proposed as a possible alternative, based on economies of scope, multi-skilling, total quality management and 
just-in-time inventory systems. Some fusion of Fordist technology and the flexible system set within the global 
economy is another possibility. The regulation approach then situates various institutions as possibly 
accommodating the generation of a new regime, such as neoliberalism or the post-neoliberal system, along 
with a series of institutional clusters associated with finance and global arrangements. 
 The SSA approach is somewhat different as it situates a number of institutional clusters as potentially 
promoting a macro or global SSA. The postwar corporate system (Bowles, Gordon and Weisskopf 1990), in 
the United States, for instance, was based (during the 1950s-1970s) around a dynamic system of production-
distribution (the capital-labor accord), US hegemony in the world economy, a balance between monopoly and 
competition, the capital-state accord (Keynesian-welfare state), regulated finance (Wolfson 1994) and a viable 
community and family system (O’Hara 1995). Many other advanced capitalist economies developed similar 
institutional clusters, though often with differences. Into the mid-1970s the contradictions within this postwar 
corporate system began to manifest through declining productivity, low growth and considerable financial 
inistability. In response to the perceived failures of traditional Keynesian policy, Thatcherism and 





dominance of neoliberalism in many nations into the 1980s and 1990s. 
This paper centres on whether neoliberalism has been promoting the creation of a new, viable regime 
of accumulation (in the MOR) or production-distribution institutions (in the SSA), characterized by high rates 
of GDP growth, sustainably high rates of productivity and financial stability (O’Hara 2006). We also explore 
whether state institutional clusters are to some degree going beyond neoliberalism, and whether these forces 
might be stimulating a new and vibrant regime of production or production-distribution system. These MOR 
and SSA regulation approaches are a core element of institutional-evolutionary political economy, as has been 
documented in the Journal of Economic Issues, for instance, by Stanfield (1984) and O’Hara (1994). 
 
Neoliberal and Post-Neoliberal Governance 
Four dominant trends associated with neoliberal state institutions have been operating in many nations and 
international institutions over the past 30 years (see O’Hara 2000, 2006b for details). First, there is a belief in 
small government. The neoliberal consensus posits the need to reduce the size of government to a far smaller 
percentage of GDP than was typical in the postwar era (1950s-early 1970s). It seeks to privatize government 
enterprises, reduce red tape, and increase corporate self-governance. Secondly, the wave of neoliberal policies 
enacted from the late-1970s to the 1990s attempted to deregulate the domestic financial system through a series 
of institutional changes. Controls over interest rates and on the separation of wholesale from retail banking, for 
instance, were dismantled. This was based on the belief that controls hurt those who can least gain access to 
finance by reducing the overall availability of finance.  
The third plank of neoliberalism has been to deregulate the labor market through reforming industrial 
relations. The main objective of these policies was to reestablish the power, profitability and viability of 
individual corporations so as to increase growth and accumulation. The fourth plank of neoliberalism is to free 
up international capital so that the global circuit of business can expand. This was done by promoting the free 
movement of money, production and trade worldwide.  
Since the late 1970s and 1980s, neoliberal principles were imposed not only in many of the advanced 
capitalist nations, but also on several nations in Africa, South and Central America and to some degree Central 
and Eastern Europe. The pattern of neoliberal control has not been uniform, and more recently (especially) 
challenges to this control have emerged. For instance, China and many emerging Asian nations used industry 
policy and state-corporate networks to enhance development. Scandinavia never did abandon their belief in the 
mixed economy. The threat of AIDS saw the need for the state to actively intervene in the social economy, 
especially in Africa. The Asian financial crisis and the corporate crises of the late-1990s and early 2000s 





policies. Latin America has reacted against crises, problematic performance and other problems by electing a 
whole series of so-called socialist and social democratic governments through the late-1990s and 2000s. More 
latterly, the global subprime crisis has seen diminishing legitimacy for neoliberal policies, although this may 
take some time to be reflected in official data. These post-neoliberal policies tend to include productive public 
capital for education, health, communications and infrastructure; discretionary fiscal and monetary policies; 
institutions for community governance; and expanding the concerns of industry (and the environment) over 
finance. 
  
Global and Regional Performance 
Here we examine the global and regional performance of economies in the light of these governance trends 
throughout the world. Table 1, below, scrutinizes the long-term rate of growth of GDP per capita. 
 














1950-1973 2.93 3.72 2.52 n.a. 2.07 3.49 2.92 
1973-2001 1.43 1.98* 1.08 n.a. 0.38 -1.10* 3.54* 









 East Asia 
& Pacific 
1970-79 2.11 2.90 3.22 3.44 1.22 n.a. 5.02 
1980-89 1.28 2.35 ─0.28 ─0.60 ─0.75  1.60 5.99 















Source: Adapted from: Maddison (2000: 126, 129); World Bank (2009).     ‡ is from UNECE (2009) 
† 2009 is an estimate (IMF 2009)  * 1973-2000 or 1990-2000.    a. = not available. 
 
These figures show that the high world growth rates in the “golden age” of the 1950s through to the early-
1970s were not re-established during the “neoliberal era” (as Maddison 2001 calls it) of the mid-late 1970s 
onwards through the 1980s, 1990s (and 2000s). Growth performance has not significantly improved for the 
world as a whole, and certainty not for the nations of the advanced Western world which were most tenacious 
in advancing the neoliberal agenda (e.g., USA, UK, and Australia). 
The growth performance of Latin America, the Middle East, Africa and Eastern Europe has been 
mixed. Like the advanced capitalist nations, virtually all these (sub)continents went through much higher 
growth rates in the 1950s-1970s than the 1970s-1990s. However their performance into the 1980s and 1990s, 
when the neoliberal influence was strongest, were generally well below par. It was only during the 2000s that 
growth started to make a moderate comeback. The late 1990s and 2000s was a time when numerous socialist 





investment. Islamic influences became stronger in the Middle East and North Africa into the 2000s as the War 
against terrorism and fundamentalist Islam expanded. Eastern European performance collapsed during the 
1990s, while the recovery into the 2000s is in part due to a counter-movement to the earlier collapse. Sub-
Saharan African economies have begun to make a modest comeback into the 2000s as eclectic, responsible 
governance is taking hold in some economies such as Botswana, South Africa, Angola and Mozambique. 
 However, it is clear that more is happening around the world than merely neoliberalism and the double 
movement against the free market through post-neoliberal governance. By itself, neither neoliberal nor post-
neoliberal forms of governance could reverse the trend of mediocre performance exhibited by many areas, nor 
be the focus of high growth rates of China and other nations of especially Asia. A key tenet of SSA and MOR 
approaches is that institutional and technological advances need to occur in other spheres—besides policy and 
governance—before performance can be majorly affected. For instance, Table 2, below, provides an outline of 
the key changes usually sought for long wave upswing in performance (see O’Hara 2003): 
 
Table 2. Core SSA and MOA Systems Affecting Performance 










































This table illustrates some of the changes likely to be necessary for a new sustainable increase in 
socioeconomic performance in both the SSA and MOA approaches. The SSA approaches tend to place 
emphasis on the need for the development of several institutional clusters (seven shown above) to stimulate 
long-term growth, productivity and stability. Of these seven, special note should be given to the institutional 
clusters of “policy and governance” and the likely need for future institutions and styles of “environmental 
technologies and systems”; but these are no more important than the other five clusters, such as the systems of 
production and distribution. Similarly, MOA approaches give priority to an effective regime of accumulation, 
constituting both a technology style enhancing productivity and a system of consumption to stimulate long-
term effective demand. The institutions beyond these realms are considered important but secondary; e.g., 
finance, competition, policy, etc. In both approaches policy and governance are linked with the other systems, 
but mentioned as clusters simply in order to show them as being relatively autonomous. 
The clearest trend is the inability of advanced capitalist economies to undergo a new regime of 





neoliberalism has been an important part of the movement in many of these advanced nations to construct a 
new and viable regime of long-term growth and productivity. But there are many other institutions and 
production systems at stake than just free markets and less government.  
 Take a look at the GDP performance of numerous high-income OECD economies, in Table 3, below: 
 
Table 3. GDP Growth Per Capita Performance of High-Income OECD Nations 
 Sweden Norway Finland S/N US UK Australia 
1960-69 3.35 3.24 3.94 1.27 2.97 2.02 3.29 
1970-79 2.04 3.85 3.67 1.54 2.23 2.26 1.70 
1980-89 2.02 2.41 3.12 1.23 2.11 2.22 1.80 
1990-99 1.28 3.03 1.15 0.94 1.87 1.86 2.10 
2000-08 2.19 1.74 2.77 1.26 1.39 2.02 1.91 
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2009) 
This comparison of GDP per capita growth rates between the Scandinavian and more neoliberal 
economies reveals two main things. Firstly, Scandinavian (S) growth rates have mostly been significantly 
above those nations of a more neoliberal (N) persuasion [S/N]. And secondly, the growth rates of both groups 
of nations have been unevenly declining since the 1960s (or 1970s). Some other factors are at play besides 
policy and governance processes. Indeed, it is the regulation approach that gives a privileged position to the 
regime of accumulation determining productivity and demand. Long wave upswing, therefore, is said to 
depend primarily on the development of a viable and proactive technology-production system and a mode of 
regulation of consumption. In both groups of nations such a regime is nowhere forthcoming. 
A similar story is told with the aid of productivity figures, in Table 3 below. Here the advanced nations 
of the OECD have been experiencing increasingly lower rates of productivity growth since the 1960s and 
1970s, including both explicitly neoliberal economies and also Scandinavian economies. The rates of growth 
during the 2000s are especially low, into single digits. On the other hand, the relatively highly developed and 
emerging economies of Asia have experienced much more rapid growth than any other areas in recent decades. 
The examples of China and South Korea are compared in Table 4, below, with neoliberal and Scandinavian 
economies:  
 
Table 4 Labor Productivity Growth, 1960-2008 (GDP per Hour Worked) 
(annual average rate of change) (GDP, Output, per work hour) 
 China Korea* Finland Sweden Norway* USA* UK* Australia* 
1960-1970 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.7 4.3 2.73 
[1964-74] 
1971-1979 2.60  3.67 1.68 4.60 2.0 2.5 1.59 
1980-1989 3.18 6.09 2.95 1.16 2.30 1.8 5.7 1.24 
1990-1999 7.30 5.43 2.74 1.94 2.72 2.0 2.2 2.41 
2000-2008* 13.30 
[2000-04] 
4.19 1.93 1.93 1.37 2.03 2.06 1.11 
Source: * = OECD (2009). Non-* data is adapted from US Department of Labor (2000: 95, 101; 2001). Non-* data is for the 
manufacturing sector; and non-* U.S. data is for the business sector as a whole.  Chinese data is adapted from Holz (2006:25). 






What this data for GDP and productivity growth tells us is that the highly developed capitalist economies have 
been experiencing a structural decline in their ability to generate a technology style and productivity regime 
(production and distribution institutions) to support accumulation and growth. When the old-style Fordist 
system declined into the 1970s and 1980s no viable regime of accumulation emerged to take its place. The 
rapidly growing and developing economies of Asia, on the other hand, have been experiencing a long wave 
upswing characterized by a regime of accumulation that exhibits high growth, productivity and real wage 
benefits. 
 As to the nature of the accumulation regime characterized by the rapidly emerging nations of Asia, it 
comprises (a) export orientation, (b) state industry policy support, (c) balance between industry and finance, 
and (d) the movement of labor from rural to urban and city centers (O’Hara 2006c). In China, for instance, the 
movement of population comprises around 10 million per year from the underemployed regions of the 
countryside to the new industrial towns and cities of the East and South-East. This exploitation of new labor is 
accompanied by high rates of labor productivity, lesser rates of capital productivity, and higher real wages. 
Clearly, non-neoliberal state and governance processes impact of this system through laws, regulations, 
enablers, and networks, and to this extent they are closely integrated into the systems of production and 
distribution. 
 No comparable regime of accumulation exists in the other areas of the world, including the advanced 
capitalist economies of the EU, North America, Japan and Australia. These nations have mostly exhausted the 
movement of population from the rural areas, also mostly women have moved from the household into the 
labor market. The main potential supply of labor comes from immigration. However, there is no viable mode of 
regulation of consumption in these nations, such as happened in the era of Fordism when the working class 
mode of consumption was high, credit moderate, providing a good basis for demand along with the Keynesian-
welfare state. Currently in most advanced capitalist nations of the West and Japan, consumption is enhanced by 
debt (rather than wages), which has not helped the building of a sustainable regime of accumulation, while 
large current account deficits are common. 
 
Financial Instability and the Mode of Consumption 
One area where neoliberalism has been having a major impact has been through deregulation of the financial 
system; reducing the power of labor compared to capital; and increasing the role of credit in production and 
consumption. All major areas of the world have been influenced by this trend, even to some major degree 
Scandinavia, Japan and Germany. Indeed, even the highly developed and emerging Asian nations deregulated 





the late 1990s.  
 Deregulating financial markets and reducing the power of labor versus capital are linked to changes in 
corporate governance over several decades. In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s the core emphasis for large 
corporations was growth through expansion and investment. Accumulation and profit rates were relatively high 
and this led to high rates of growth, as did the higher wages that added demand to consumption expenditures. 
But the neoliberal trend, especially in advanced capitalist nations, of deregulating finance and labor markets led 
to less demand for industry and productive investment and more for finance and consumption goods. This shift 
from productive to relatively unproductive (fictitious capital) spending played a role in the declining 
productivity and growth rates of the 19780s, 1990s and 2000s. 
 This has been well documented by the research of Binswanger (2000), Stockhammer 2004), Palley 
(2007), O’Hara (2009) and others who show that financialisation is a core tendency of advanced capitalist 
nations while industry has been in remission. Placing emphasis on shareholder value, the equity market and 
debt has increased systemic risk and the tendency for financial crises to recur and become more intense. For 
instance, Table 5, below, shows the trend towards more extreme financial crises from the great boom of the 
1949s-1970s to the downgrade of the 1970s-1990s. 
 
Table 5. Banking, Currency Crises in the World: 1945-1997: 21 Nation Sample 
 Probability of  










Output Loss  
of Crises  




for output to 
normalize) 
1945-1971 7.04 37 1 1 5.24 1.78 
1973-1997 9.68 86 26 27 7.77 2.64 
Source: Adapted from Eichengreen & Bordo (2002) 
 
Comparing the upswing of 1945-1971 with the downswing of 1973-1997, banking and currency crises 
increased markedly. Financial crises became more pronounced in the 1980s than the 1970s, and more 
pronounced in the 1990s than the 1980s. There was only 1 banking crisis during the long-wave upswing of 
1945-1971, but 26 during the downswing of the 1970s-1990s. There were 37 currency crises during the 
upswing, but 86 during downswing. Overall, the probability, number, output loss, and recovery time associated 
with crises were all much greater during the time of neoliberalism than beforehand. The real problem is the 
emergence of twin crises (currency and banking crises), which were only 1 in number during long wave 
upswing, but 27 during the downswing when neoliberalism was strong (O’Hara 2006b).  
 Recently also the world has been experiencing the greatest global crisis and recession since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. While full data will not emerge until well into 2010 or 2011, Table 6 compares the 






Table 6. International Financial Crises and Recessions, Impact, 1889-2009 











1889-92 Baring Crisis Significant n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1929-32 Great Depression Catastrophic ─35%  
(1930-32) 
n.a. Whole World 






1970s: 7 crises 
Some core areas 






1980s: 33 crises 




Global Recession, plus 





1990s: 58 crises 




Internet & Subprime 







2000s: 85 crises for 2009. 
Most Nations (esp. 
advanced) 
Source: Adapted from various sources; including World Bank (2009); IMF (2009:128-9); O’Hara (2009). For 
number of crises/nations involved for the 1970s-1990s, see Herro & Rio (2003:53).†
 
 
This data shows that there have been several international financial crises, including none during long wave 
upswing of the 1950s-early 1970s, and several during the long wave downswing in the advanced nations and 
elsewhere during the 1970s-2000s. The 1970s saw seven major financial crises; and this grew to 33 crises in 
the 1980s, 58 crises in the 1990s, and then to 85 crises during the time of the subprime crisis. Financial 
instability has thus majorly increased over the decades as shareholder value, fictitious capitals, unproductive 
state spending and high debt levels have increased instability. The subprime crisis, for instance, is the greatest 
global crisis and recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s. It brought home not merely problems of 
neoliberalism and deregulation of finance, but also anomalies of finance often having a greater financial return 
than industry due to an insufficiently developed regime of accumulation.  
The evidence is clear that the trend to financialization is closely linked with the trend to neoliberalism; 
but it also goes beyond simply neoliberalism. It relates to the changing motivation of corporations from growth 
to shareholder value, and to the sectoral metamorphosis from industry to services. The advanced capitalist 
economies (in particular) have been undergoing industrial maturation and hegemonic decline, while much of 
Asia is experiencing a systemic rise in power. Thus we are seeing major changes in core, periphery and semi-
periphery relationships at the global, regional and local levels. History has always experienced these periods of 
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estimates from IMF (2009:170, 171-176)). This is a viable method since, for 2007-09, the financial crisis caused the 





uneven development, while currently we are seeing a major shift in power from the centre to the semi-
periphery.  
 In the meantime, it is likely that the core nations will continue to experience a high degree of financial 
instability, low growth and perhaps deep recession which can often impact negatively on peripheral and semi-
peripheral nations. When finance dominates industry and the service sector is the most rapidly growth sector, 
productivity changes are likely to be below par in the advanced nations. While this certainly represents a 
continuing period of long wave downswing (at least for the advanced capitalist areas), the question does arise 
as to whether any forces are at work generating new industries and potential long wave upswing. Sectoral 
metamorphoses are long-term in nature, and no movement is currently at work generating major productivity 
increases into the future for the advanced Western nations. Instead we are likely to see advances in Asia and 
possibly other continents in the periphery and semi-periphery. 
 But what of the policy changes that are happening on the back of the subprime crisis and recession? 
These include more proactive fiscal and monetary policy, highly activist lender of last resort, a deepening of 
deposit insurance, nationalizations of core financial institutions, as well as greater transparency, more 
prudential functions, and recognizing the importance of systemic risk. More generally these changes indicate 
that even in a framework of late-neoliberal maturity and likely demise some considerable flexibility and 
adaptability exists in governance which is a healthy sign, preventing major depression for the world. Will these 
policy changes result in a decline in neoliberalism and the emergence of a new social structure of accumulation 
or mode of regulation? While these changes auger in a new period of declining power and significance for 
neoliberalism in favor of more balanced forms of governance, many more changes are likely needed for long 
wave upswing. The prime change, as indicated above, is for a new and dynamic mode of regulation, including 
a regime of accumulation generating both productivity increases and effective demand expansions. Industrial 
changes and the current state of capital-labor relations does not proffer well in this respect, at least in the 
advanced capitalist nations. Many more systemic and core institutional changes are required before long wave 
upswing is likely to emerge. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper raised the question of whether neoliberalism has had some positive influence on socioeconomic 
performance by affecting social structures of accumulation or modes of regulation. It also raised the issue of 
whether there have been any changes beyond neoliberalism that may auger in a post-neoliberal framework, and 
whether this may be affecting performance and institutional potentiality. The conclusions made are that 





changes may be positively affecting some nations and areas. 
 However, the paper emphasizes that a new social structure of accumulation or regime of accumulation 
depends on a much wider sphere of changes than simply the terrain of neoliberal versus post-neoliberal 
governance. New SSAs and regimes depend on policy, but also capital-labor relations, competition-monopoly 
linkages, family-community processes, finance, trade, and most importantly production and distribution 
arrangements. Examined within this wider framework, the world as a whole has not established a (series of) 
dynamic system(s) of production and distribution for long wave upswing. However, China and the Asian 
archipelago have been undergoing a remarkable industrial transformation which represents a viable social 
structure of accumulation and mode of regulation. Some of the other continents, such as Latin America, Sub-
Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe have made some improvements, but not enough for long 
wave upswing at this stage. 
 Neoliberalism is thus only one aspect of the institutional and technological environment necessary to 
transform the political economies of the world. The wider question is the need for a new viable regime of 
accumulation to promote productivity and effective demand. The major capitalist economies are mostly 
undergoing industrial metamorphosis where industry is dominated by finance, where productivity and GDP 
growth per capita are insufficient to auger in a new long wave upswing. Even if post-neoliberal institutions 
emerge victorious out of the current global subprime crisis, many more systemic changes are needed for 
sustainable growth and development into the future, for the advanced nations and many others. 
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